CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 140

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no prospect that they would become responsible for filling the power vacuum that ensued. Despite this reaction we should hold to our plans to reduce our forces in Singapore/Malaysia by about half by 1970-71 and to withdraw these forces altogether by the mid-1970s, presenting these moves as part of a single logical plan. This would add somewhat to the difficulties of the

United States Administration but would be likely to accord in timing with their objectives of bringing the war in Vietnam to an end in the next year or two.

The consultations which the Defence Secretary was to have in Singapore and Malaysia should be on the same basis as those which he had had in Washington and should make clear that what we intended to do was right on grounds both of economy and policy.

THE DEFENCE SECRETARY said that he was in full agreement with the Foreign

Secretary. It was essential that we should inform the Governments of

Singapore and Malaysia of our plans as fully as we had those of the United

States, Australia and New Zealand. It was also essential that as soon as

possible we should be able to say that we were willing to maintain a military

presence in the Far East after we had left Singapore and Malaysia.

If we

could not do this we should be repudiating earlier statements of policy made

by the present Administration. We could not otherwise hope to obtain

acquiescence in our plans nor indeed to maintain the credibility of the

Government's statements. But we should not, without further consideration,

attempt to specify even in general terms the nature of this presence or its

size, and in particular we should not at this stage imply that our capability

would necessarily be in the form of forces permanently stationed in the area.

As regards costs, the first rough calculations that had been made of the saving

of £300 million in 1975-76 that would result in defence expenditure if our plans included total withdrawal from Singapore/Malaysia by then had allowed

for the spending of €10 million annually in the Far East on a continuing

in addition presence there and, for consequential expenditure in this country on the capability to reinforce if necessary.

It

In discussion there was general agreement with the views expressed by the Foreign and Defence Secretaries. Our objective remained to take decisions on all aspects of our defence policy and programme in June/July.

appeared that progress towards decisions on the Far East aspect of our policy

would be seriously delayed, with a consequential deferment of sarings which

we would achieve, unless we were shortly able to indicate a willingness to maintain a presence in the area after our withdrawal from Singapore/Malaysia.

This would require further consideration by the Cabinet.

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